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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JULIE F. HAYS, Guardian ad litem
for KA THY SHAWN HAYS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RAYMOND DONALD ROBERTSON,
Defendant and Appellant,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Garnishee and Appellant.
MRS. MELVIN SANDERS, Guardian
ad litem for PAULETTE F. SANDERS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RAYMOND DONALD ROBERTSON,
Defendant and Appellant,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Garnishee and Appellant

Case
No.
10866

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal From the Judgment of the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge
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[JWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
. Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
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Respondents

By LAWREN CE L. SUMMERHAYS

604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City ,Utah
Attorneys for Garnishee and
Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JULIE F. HAYS, Guardian ad litem
for KA THY SHAWN HAYS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RAYMOND DONALD ROBERTSON
Defendant and Appellant, '
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Garnishee and Appellant.
MRS. MELVIN SANDERS, Guardian
act litem for PAULETTE F. SANDERS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
RA Y:\lOND DONALD ROBERTSON,
Defendant and Appellant,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE C01\1PANY,
Garn;shef' and Appellant

Case
No.
10866

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs both minor children were injured as
a result of a collision between an automobile driven
by Raymond Donald Robertson and an automobile
driven by one of plaintiffs, Kathy Shawn Hays. Judgment was entered in favor of both the plaintiffs
against Robertson, demand was made upon State
1

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for
payment of the judgment. Said demand was refused,
garnishment issued. Issue was joined on the traverse
to garnishment answers. The Trial Court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. It determined
that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company was the liability insurer of Raymond Donald
Robertson on the date of collision. Plaintiffs were
awarded judgment in the amount obtained against
Robertson. The Garnishee-Appellant prosecutes this
appeal.
Basic question is the meaning of the insurance
policy issued by Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the
appellant for the amount of the judgment obtained
against its insured, together with interest and costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The insurance carrier, garnishee appellant,
seeks a reversal of the judgment of the lower court
and entry of judgment that no coverage was provided
for defendant Raymond Donald Robertson.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no basic disagreement between the
parties as to the happening of the accident and the
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mJuries sustained by the plaintiffs. The only disagreement relates to the meaning of the State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Policy No. 4068 290E22-44.
For five or six years before the accident, Loyd
J. Robertson had purchased public liability insurance
from R. W. Steeneck, an agent of State Farm, for
himself and family ( R 129) . Steeneck was well
acquainted with the Robertsons, knew the kind of
protection they wanted and the persons to be protected CR 130). The family consisted of Loyd, June
( wife J, and two minor sons, Raymond and Robert
(Exhibit D-5, R 130).
Several cars were used by the family over the
years and insurance ordered by phone by Robertson
from Steeneck. Raymond was born November 21,
1943 and on April 6, 1965 would be 21 years old but
still a member of Loyd's household (Exhibit D-5) .
Steeneck, on the application, classified the risk
as Class 9, which is a youthful male driver CR 133,
Exhibit D-5). The exhibit also shows Raymond as
the principal driver.
When the insurance was transferred from the
1955 Ford to the 1962 Chevrolet, the car title was not
shown to be in Raymond's name, though it is conceded that such was always the fact CR 100).
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The Chevrolet was surrendered to the bank
when Raymond could not pay the purchase price. On
April 5th Raymond purchased the 1958 Chevrolet to
replace the 1962 Chevrolet, and the next day the
accident occurred. Raymond shows his address as at
his father's home on the application for title to the
1958 Chevrolet (Exhibit D-6). His father testified he
had all his clothing at home, although he had rented
a room to sleep in after he lost his. car so that he could
catch a ride to work ( R 98).
The ambiguity was created m the issuance of
the insurance policy. The policy shows on its face
that the named insureds are Loyd J. Robertson and
June Robertson, that persons insured are Loyd J.
Robertson, R. Robertson and R. D. Robertson. Continental Bank of Midvale is shown as lienholder. The
vehicle described was a 1962 Chevrolet pickup at all
times the property of Raymond.
The policy language assumes that the named
insured is the titleholder of the car insured, which
was not the fact.
The public liability policy under Definitions
states:
"Insured - under coverages A, B, C and M
the unqualified word 'insured' includes
( 1 ) the named insured, and
( 2) if the named insured is a person or
4

persons, also includes his or their
spouse Cs), if a resident of the same
household, and
C3) if residents of the same household the
relatives of the first person nam~d in
the declarations, or of his spouse, and
( 4) any other person while using the
owned automobile, provided the operation and the actual use of such automobile are with the permission of the
named insured or such spouse and are
within the scope of such permission,
and***."
The policy defines "owned automobile" m the
following language:
"Owned Automobile-means the motor vehicle
or trailer described in the declarations, and
includes a temporary substitute automobile, a
newly acquired automobile,***."
The "owned automobile" described in the policy
had been surrendered to the Continental Bank of
Midvale and Raymond Donald Robertson had purchased the automobile involved in the collision to
replace it.
The language of the policy defines "temporary
substitute automobile" and "newly acquired automobile" in the following language:
"Temporary Substitute Automobile-means an
automobile not owned by the named insured
or his spouse while temporarily used as a sub-
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stitute for the described automobile when
withdrawn from normal use because of its
breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction."
"Newly Acquired Automobile - means an
automobile, ownership of which is acquired
by the named insured or his spouse, if a resident of the same household, if ( 1) it replaces
an automobile owned by either and covered
by this policy, or the company insures all
automobiles owned by the named insured and
such spouse on the date of its delivery, and
( 2) the named insured within 30 days following such delivery date applies to the company
for insurance on such newly acquired automobile. If more than one policy issued by the
company could be applied to such automobile
the named insured shall elect which policy
shall apply. The named insured shall pay
any additional premium required because of
the application of the insurance to such newly
acquired automobile."
In addition to providing the coverage on the persons in the same household and the persons using the
owned automobile, the policy provided coverage for
a non-owned automobile and defines a non-owned
automobile as:
"Non-Owned Automobile mobile or trailer not***

means an auto-

( i) (ii)
(iii) furnished or available for the frequent
or regular use of the named insured, his
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spouse, or any relative of either residing in
the same household, other than a temporary
substitute automobile."
The Trial Court found that a fair interpretation
of the policy provided coverage for Raymond Donald
Robertson on the 6th of April, 1965 at the time of the
collision between his automobile and the automobile
being driven by Kathy Shawn Hays in which Paulette
F. Sanders was a passenger.
A reading of the policy and all of its many definitions and terms indicates that it was ini:ended to
provide public liability insurance for Raymond
Robertson under all of the circumstances which arose,
whether he was driving someone else's car, the Chevrolet pickup, a newly acquired car, a substitute automobile, or a non-owned automobile.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACT THAT TITLE TO THE 1962 AND
1958 AUTOMOBILE WAS IN RAYMOND'S
NAME IS IMMATERIAL.
The policy of insurance which is Exhibit P-1 is
a State Farm Mutual Automobile policy and a form
policy designed to be used in the normal situation
where the person described as the named insured is
the owner of the vehicle described on the policy. In
7

the present case, one of the persons to be covered by
public liability insurance, namely Raymond Robertson, was the owner of the vehicle but was not the
named insured and, as a consequence, there is an
ambiguity created which must be resolved by interpreting the policy to arrive at the intentions of the
parties.
The evidence is clear that Loyd J. Robertson
intended to purchase public liability insurance for
himself, his wife, and two boys. It also is clear that
the insurance agent, Steeneck, understood the kind
of insurance that Robertson wanted and intended to
give the Robertson family the coverage that Loyd
Robertson desired.
It is plaintiff's position that their interpretation placed on the policy is one which will accomplish
the purpose that the parties intended to accomplish.
The risk which Robertsons paid the insurance
company to insure is described in the insuring agreement as, "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of (A) bodily injury
sustained by other persons, and ( B) property damage
caused by accident arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use, including loading or unloading
of the owned automobile.***"
(Exhibit P-1, Coverages A and B, Paragraph 1)
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The unqualified word "insured" in the policy
is defined as the named insured and his spouse, and
if resident of the same household, relatives of the
named insured or his spouse. See Definitions-Insuring Agreement I and II.
The ownership of the automobile did not in any
way affect the risk, neither increasing or diminishing
it. The risk always remained the same to protect, i.e.
the Loyd J. Robertson family against public liability
loss.
A case exactly in point on this matter is General
Insurance Company vs. Western Fire & Caszmlty Company, 241 F 2d 289, 5 CCA, (Brown Judge) Cert.
denied, 77 S. Ct. 1294, 354 US 909, No. 941, June 10,
195 7. The facts are exactly those in the present case.
A son 20 years old, living with his mother, insurance
applied for and taken in the mother's name on a car
partly owned by the son. This car was traded in for
a car titled to the son and it then became involved in
an accident within the 30 day period after the new
car was acquired. The court there discussed the question of the son being the owner of the new car and
the mother having no interest in it. It placed considerable emphasis on the fact that this was the family
liability type of policy. It held ownership of the
vehicle was immaterial.
People who are not sophisticated in the insurance
policy language, who have no intention to deceive,
g

and do their best to keep the insurance company
agent advised, may rely on the company issuing a
policy which will give to them the protection that
they need for their own benefit and protect the public
who might be injured in the use of the vehicles
involved.
Judge Brown pointed out that the ownership of
the vehicle in no way affected the risk which the
insurance company underwrote nor contributed in
any way to the happening of the accident and that
if it were necessary, he would order that the ownership of the vehicle involved and described in the
policy be correctly described and an amendment to
the policy ordered.
The question which seems to be dominant in
the minds of the courts considering the problem
before this court is whether or not the risk which is
insured against is increased by the misstatement as
to ownership of the vehicle.
An examination of the language of the insurance
policy and the various definitions would indicate
that the company intended to insure the Loyd J.
Robertson family against public liability from the use
of motor vehicles. The definitions describe every conceivable contingency that might involve one of the
persons to be protected. It specifically protected them
when driving a non-owned automobile, an owned
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automobile, including an automobile newly acquired
if it replaces an automobile covered by the policy
and if, within 30 days, notice of the change of automobile is given. This collision occurred on the day
after the newly acquired automobile had been purchased.
It is respectfully submitted that the circum-

stances are exactly the same and that the General
Insurance Company vs. Western Fire & Casualty
Company case is identical on its facts to the case at
bar and the reasoning of Judge Brown in that decision
is unimpeachable.
In addition to the General Insurance Company
vs. Western Fire & Casualty Company (supra) case,
there are a number of cases holding that the state of
title is immaterial and. does not increase the risk
insured against. See Mid-States Ins. Co. vs. Brandon,
340 Ill. App. 470, 92 NE 2d 540; Commonw£!alth
Casualty Company vs. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 A
136, 77 ALR 1250; Pauli vs. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company, 167 Misc. 417, 4 NY Sup. 2d 41,
affirmed 255 App. Div. 935, 8 NY Sup. 2d 691, App.
Den 280 NY 853, 19 NE 2d 685; Kuntz vs. Spence,
Tex Civ. App. 1931, 48 S.W. 2d 413.

Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile La.w and
Practice, Perm. Ed. Part I, #3873 Page 537, states as
follows:
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"The rule requiring possession by the insured of
an insurable interest in the property forming the subject matter of the insurance, which prevails generally
in casualty insurance, is not applicable to liability
indemnity policies."
"The character of the insurance is quite different
from insurance, against injury or loss, of the property
insured by fire, theft, collision, or the like, where the
insured is required to have some real interest in the
property insured; in the case of liability insurance
the risk and hazard insured against is not the injury
or loss of the property named in the policy, but
against loss and injury caused by the use of the
property therein named, for which the insured might
be liable, and the right of the insured to recover does
not depend upon his being the holder, in fact of either
a legal or equitable title or interest in the property,
but whether he is primarily charged at law or in
equity with an obligation for which he is liable."
Raymond, a member of Loyd's household, was
covered by the insurance policy while driving any
vehicle. He likewise would be covered while driving
the vehicle described regardless of who held title, and
no additional risk would be created when he drove
a newly acquired automobile~ or a replacement
vehicle.

12

POINT II
THE POLICY WHEN CONSTRUED IN ALL ITS
TERMS PROVIDES COVERAGE FOR RAYMOND.
The policy must be interpreted favorably to the
insured being insured where there is a dispute as to
its meaning. See Appleman, Vol. 13, Page 36, #7386.
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile L<iw and Practice, Perm. Ed., Part I, Vol. 6, #3521, Page 138.
In addition to the general coverage provided for
Raymond as a member of Loyd's family and household, the coverage on the automobile described is
clear. A newly acquired automobile is covered if
notice is given to the insurer. Where an accident
occurs before notice, the cases without exception hold
that coverage is available.

General Insurance Company vs. Western Fire &:
Casualty Company, 241 F 2d 289 (5 CCA), Gert.
Denied 77 S. Ct. 1294, 354 U.S. 909, No. 941, June
10, 1957.
Western Casualty & Surety Company vs. Lund,
132 F Supp. 867, Aff. 234 F 2d 916, 10 CCA, (Bratton
Judge). (Two successive replacements of automobiles
in 30 day period, both held covered for 30 days regardless of notice to insurer.)
Civil Service Employees Insurance ComfXJnY vs.
Wilson, 35 Cal Rep 304, 222 Cal. App. 2d 519.
13

(Several auto covered intepret newly acquired clause
also clause on all autos insured with insurer pro-'
vision).
7 Appleman, Chapter 183 P. 84, states the rule
applicable as follows:
"The purpose of automatic insurance is to give
coverage to persons who are already insured with the
company in question upon acquiring a new vehicle.
The coverage extends to the new acquisition when it
replaces the sole automobile owned by the insured
when the insured owns a number of vehicles and
all of them are insured with the company, or
when several of the vehicles owned by the insured
are covered by the policy and the new acquisition
replaces one already covered. It does not apply to
new vehicles which are in addition to those insured by
the former coverages and which are not used as
replacements, unless all vehicles of that insured are
covered, in which event it is contemplated that a
premium readjustment will be made."
California jurisdiction has solved the problem
created here in a little different manner than the
Federal Court in the Fifth Circuit. In Votaw vs.
Farmers Auto Inter-Ins. Exchange, 15 Cal 2d 24, 97 P
2d 958 126 A.LR 538, the court held that an auto'
.
.
mobile which had been sold but title not yet transfered while being driven by the buyer, was a person
14

driving with the owner's permission and the public
liability insurance coverage was provided. See also
Clow vs. National Indemnity Company, 54 Was 2d
198, 339 P 2d 82, where a new automobile was purchased and while it was being readied for delivery,
the insured continued to drive his old car.
Raymond is a person included in the unqualified
word "insured." He was a resident of the household
of Loyd and a person who actually is designated as
the principal driver of the vehicle insured originally.
Automobiles acquired to replace the Ford or newly
acquired, for 30 days would likewise be covered without imposing a new or different risk on the insurer.
If Raymond drove any kind of a motor vehicle,
it is respectfully submitted he had public liability
insurance for the 30 day period. No hole in his
insurance was intended to exist. If non-owned vehicle,
coverage is provided, if the described vehicle, coverage
is provided, if a replacement vehicle for described
vehicle, coverage is provided, if a newly acquired
vehicle, coverage is provided for 30 days, the crucial
period.

CONCLUSIONS
It is respectfully submitted that a fair interpretation of the policy would provide coverage for Ray-
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mond. Judgment of the Trial Court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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